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Thinking beyond Secularism: The
Catholic Church and Political
Practice in Rural South India
Aparna Sundar
1 In recent years, the notion that the world is inexorably moving towards secularisation
has been effectively laid to rest, with the rise of a religious right in the United States, the
growing  reach  of  Pentecostalism  across  the  world,  the  spread  of  political  Islamic
movements across Asia and Africa (Casanova 1996, Gorski & Altinordu 2008, Freedman
2009, Mahmood 2004). Within India, the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party, with its claim
to  represent  the  Hindu  majority,  as  well  as  the  issues  it  has  raised  vis-à-vis  other
religions, such as Christian conversion and Muslim adherence to personal law instead of a
common civil code (Jaffrelot 1996, Bhatt 2001) have sparked a series of analytical and
normative debates about the nature of Indian secularism (Bhargava 1998, Tejani 2008,
Srinivasan 2007, Needham & Sunder Rajan 2007). On political platforms the debate has
been waged between those who advocate a strict separation of religion and state (the left-
liberal position), to those who argue that Indian secularism has meant a tolerance of all
religions and equal respect and patronage for them by the state, to those who argue for a
form of Hindu theocracy (Tejani 2008: 7-11).
2 In academic terms, the lines have been drawn most sharply between T.N. Madan and
Ashish Nandy, on the one hand, who argue that secularism is alien to India, where all the
major religions have prioritised religion over politics, and comes from Protestantism and
its particular relationship to science and state (Madan 1998, Nandy 1998),  and Rajeev
Bhargava who argues for a  distinctive form of  Indian secularism,  based not  on rigid
separation, but a ‘principled distance’ between religion and state, based on contextual
moral reasoning about what each religion required and how this fitted in with the lines
that the state had demarcated for itself (Bhargava 2007). Thus if Christians feel the need
for conversion,  while no other religion does,  or Muslims feel  the need for their own
personal law in some spheres,  a secular state would recognise these imperatives and
balance them with the interests of others. While the Madan/Nandy argument has been
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criticised, not least because it does not reflect the trajectory of European or American
secularism (Archer 2001), Bhargava’s approach runs the risk of focusing too much on the
state, and not adequately looking at forces within religion itself which may be driving
certain kinds of secularism and democratisation (Nigam 2006, Tejani 2008).
3 Sociological  attention  to  the  forces  driving  secularism  and  democratisation  within
religions, and more broadly to the ways in which religion interacts with politics, has been
limited, in what has often been a theoretical debate around secularism. This neglect is
especially striking with regard to the ʻminorityʼ communities outside the main-frame of
Hindu nationalism, with some honourable exceptions (essays in Saberwal & Hasan 2006).
We still  know little about new forms of religious subjectivity,  about struggles around
representation,  and  about  larger  national  and  transnational  influences  on  religious
practice, identity and political assertion within such communities.
4 This  article  breaks  new ground by  looking  at  politicised  Christianity  and its  role  in
creating certain kinds of citizens.1 I argue that debates over secularism need to look at
the ways in which particular religions construct the good life, and if, or the extent to
which, this comes into conflict with secular ideals. I look at the way in which the Catholic
Church in Kanyakumari mediates the relationship of villagers with the state and civil
society  through  structures  and  ideologies  of  authority  and  participation,  faith,  and
identity. Rather than taking away from some abstract universal identity, I show how it is
the local Church that makes it possible for individuals to participate as citizens. Contrary
to the sense that religious politics occupies a separate sphere from that of the secular,
there is in fact an articulation of the politics of the Church to the secular politics of the
state,  and  vice  versa.  The  Catholic  Church  often  draws  on  the  same  tropes  of
development, nationalism and uplift as the state, and the shifts in ideological orientation
(right to left to right) within it mirror those in other contexts both international, and
national.
5 The empirical core of this paper draws on field work conducted in seven fishing villages
in Kanyakumari district of Tamil Nadu in South India over two periods in 1994-1995 and
2004, and on continuing conversations with diocesan priests and lay people in the years
since then. Kanyakumari district borders Kerala and has a sizable Christian minority,
though not all  of it is Catholic.  According to the 1991 census, 42.35% of the district’s
population identified as Christian, compared to 19.32% in Kerala, 5.69% in Tamil Nadu,
and  2.32%  (only  1.7%  of  whom  are  Catholics)  in  India  as  a  whole.  Located  at  the
southernmost edge of the district, are the forty two coastal fishing villages which are the
focus of this article. Kurien (2000) has noted that the fishing villages in Kerala prove an
aberration to the ʻKerala modelʼ of high literacy and social development; this is equally
the case in Kanyakumari, as it is globally (Bene 2003). The fishing castes – Mukkuvar and
Paravar – that make up these villages are both categorised as ʻOther Backward Classesʼ in
the  Indian  Constitution,  for  purposes  of  affirmative  action.  Despite  their  traditional
economic and social marginality, these fishing communities have a strong sense of their
own identity, stemming from an awareness of their long lineage in the region, pride in
their difficult profession, their independence from everyday ritual submission to higher
castes, and their conversion to Catholicism in the sixteenth century. Notwithstanding
their relative poverty, and the strong identification with place, they are not isolated.
They are shaped by a variety of intellectual, social and political influences made possible
by their closeness to the district headquarters of Nagercoil, a busy town of some two
hundred thousand in 2001, as well as to Thiruvananthapuram, the capital of Kerala; the
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constant flow of tourists to Kanyakumari; the presence of an international institution –
the Catholic Church; the fishermen’s own mobility, both across the country and to the
countries of the Persian Gulf; and the villagers’ steady consumption of films, television,
and now, the Internet.
6 Although the Catholic  Church is  an institution of  singular  importance in the coastal
villages of  Kanyakumari,  there is  no single way of understanding its role.  It  is  a key
element of the identity of the villagers, the basis of their faith, and an intimate part of
their everyday lives and struggles. As Kalpana Ram (1992) has argued, it also functions as
a ʻquasi-stateʼ in the villages. From the time of the Church’s entry here five centuries ago,
every state of the day, including that of postcolonial India, has accommodated it, allowed
it to take on administrative and judicial functions, and to represent the villagers. The size
and  prominence  of  the  church  in  every  village,  especially  when  contrasted  to  the
cramped housing of the villagers, illustrates its centrality as a structure of authority. The
Church also operates at multiple scales beyond the local: not only as part of a powerful
international  institution,  but  at  the  national  scale,  as  representing a  small  minority.
Catholic faith and identity are deeply rooted and thoroughly indigenised; nevertheless, as
an international institution, the Church must constantly struggle between introducing
new ideas and directives from the World Church (for instance, around theological purity
and liturgical practice), and the need to ʻinculturateʼ2 and remain indigenous, especially
in the context of Hindu nationalism. Nor is the relationship between the local Church and
its  community  entirely  harmonious,  with  its  authority  being  constantly  called  into
question,  and many of  its  own activities being about restoring or trying to maintain
legitimacy. Charting the course this struggle has taken over the centuries – between the
secular and the spiritual, the international and the national, the institutional and the
popular – is necessary to a complex understanding of the Church’s present role.
7 Much of the task of mediation between the different levels outlined above is carried out
by individual  clergymen,  many of  whom come from the fishing villages.  Drawing on
Gramsci’s  schema  (1971:  5-14),  this  article  examines  their  role  as  agents  of
transformation, both as organic intellectuals representing their class, and as traditional
intellectuals who articulate the ideology of the Church and state. Attending closely to the
background  and  role  of  the  clergy  helps  us  to  compare  and  counterpose  their
involvement in politics with similarly placed individuals in Hindu right organisations,
most of whom are drawn from the upper castes (Jaffrelot 1996, Saberwal & Hasan 2006),
and for whom the intertwining of religion and politics is a way of keeping other castes
and religions down.
8 Church-related associations play another key linking role between the Church and state. 
Over the years, for reasons having to do locally with needing to maintain legitimacy with
its followers, nationally with matching secular movements aimed at social reform, and
internationally with movements of  contestation and reform,  the Catholic  Church has
introduced  a  variety  of  associational  forms  in  the  villages.  These  range  from  pious
associations and youth groups,  to the Basic Christian Communities (BCCs) and Parish
Councils. They have become spaces from within which the Church struggles to maintain
its relevance, and from which parishioners seek to make claims upon the Church and
state, while simultaneously asserting their autonomy from them. But they are also spaces
within which villagers seek to reform the hierarchies of village life itself, such as the
exclusion of women from political authority. Religiosity here is mediated by an awareness
of wider Indian tropes of democracy and development, and villagers’ ability to negotiate
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between the Church and other patrons such as political parties in order to further their
secular interests. Fishers rarely act only as Catholics, but also as members of backward
castes, regional and linguistic identities, fisher people, and women. Equally importantly,
the  associations are  spaces  where  members  learn  the  routines  and  technologies  of
modern governance, such as rules of order for the conduct of meetings, minutes and
accounts, village censuses, and membership cards.
9 In the first part of this article, I provide a brief history of the Roman Catholic Church in
the region, its key structures, influences and turning points. From the beginning, it was
embedded  in  local  politics,  establishing  parallel  structures  of  justice  and  revenue
collection, while also moulding itself to local caste hierarchies and aiding rulers in their
conflict  with other powers.  In the second section,  I  look at  contemporary efforts  by
individual clergymen to articulate ideas of reform and development, mediating between
their own class, the wider Church hierarchy and the state. The third section looks at
villagers’  participation in Church-generated civil  society associations as spaces where
they negotiate between spiritual and secular imperatives, and the shifting alliances this
leads to. The article ends with a discussion of the Catholic Church's place in the political
community, particularly in relation to democratisation, development and communalism,
concluding  that  we  need  to  think  of  practices  of  religiosity  and  citizenship  as  not
mutually exclusive.
 
The Catholic Church in Kanyakumari - a brief history
Origins and early history
10 A relationship of accommodation and collaboration for mutual benefit was established
between Church personnel and the state from the Catholic Church’s very beginnings in
the region. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were a period of enormous political flux,
with  contending  rulers  like  the  Kingdoms  of  Venad  (later  Travancore),  Cochin,  the
Pandyas, the Nayak of Madurai, and the Zamorin of Calicut seeking to control both the
pearl trade and populations associated with it, and enlisting Portuguese support in this.
The  Paravars  converted  in  1536  in  exchange  for  Portuguese  protection  of  their
independence  in  the  pearl  trade  (Bayly  1989:  323-5,  Schurhammer  1973-1982:  259,
Fernando 1984), while access to the Mukkuvars was enabled by Portuguese support for
the Venad king against the Pandyas in 1544 (Narchison et al 1983: 12).
11 Given the tactical nature of the conversions (Bayly 1989: 328), a new religious identity was
slow to emerge. The syncretic nature of the emerging religious tradition was exemplified
by the growing cult of St Francis Xavier, whom the Jesuits encouraged the Paravars to
revere as a supernaturally endowed tutelary figure, exorcist, and healer (Bayly 1989: 330),
with features of the Sufi tazkiras (saints' biographies), and of the region’s warrior cults.
Other pre-Christian traditions endured such as the pulling of a decorated chariot for the
feast days of the church, as in a temple festival; and caste histories and oral traditions
which relate the Paravars and their rituals to the great Hindu temples of southern Tamil
Nadu (Bayly 1989: 330-58). The question of caste hierarchies was contentious from the
very beginning. Influential priests such as Robert de Nobili took the position that the
maintenance  of  caste  separation  (having  different  churches  for  different  castes,  or
serving them mass at different times) was necessary for the survival and spread of the
Church in the region and had no religious implications. This received papal assent in the
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early 1600s, while later Popes overturned it as a religious sacrilege. In practice, separate
churches  were  constructed  for  the  inland  Nadars  and  the  coastal  Mukkuvars  and
Paravars; in some churches a wall was erected to separate seating areas for the higher
and lower castes (Roche 1984, Subramanian 2009: 49-50).
12 Parochial  governance  increasingly  relied  on  the  fusion  between  the  group's  caste
institutions and their identity as Roman Catholics. The Roman Church had been allowed
by the Raja of Venad to arbitrate in civil and criminal matters for its members. Xavier and
subsequent  missionaries  used the  village  leaders as  a  kind  of  moral  police  against
drunkenness,  adultery,  idolatry,  and  other  transgressions.  Portuguese  colonial
authorities  confirmed these powers,  using the local  leaders’  authority  to  recruit  and
discipline Paravar divers and others necessary to a productive fishery (Bayly 1989). The
missionaries also introduced new structures of administration, appointing a judge and a
policeman in every village, and themselves adjudicating more serious cases (Thekkedath
1982: 189). Lay involvement in running the parish and in ministry was solicited from the
outset to make up for the shortage of priests; the first pious association, the Confraternity
of Charity, was set up some twenty years after the Paravar conversions (Thekkedath 1982:
167-73). Although the kings of Venad, Quilon and Cochin contributed to the erection of
churches in their territory, and for a while to their maintenance, and the Portuguese
Governor  during  Xavier's  time  paid  an  annual  sum  to  support  the  missionaries
(Schurhammer 1973-1982: 462-3, Xavier 1992: 124 n.11), the lay officers were maintained,
the bulk of the churches constructed, and, in later years, the priests supported, through
taxes on the fishery in each village. A variety of levies were imposed, to the extent that
the Portuguese priests were commonly referred to as kuthagaikkara samigal [levy-priests]
(Sivasubramanian 1996).
13 The new religious identity worked not only to create cohesion in the caste and enable it
to manoeuvre more efficiently for status vis-à-vis other castes and the rulers, but also to
bargain  with  the  Church  hierarchy  itself.  By  the  1830s  the  Jesuits  found  that  caste
notables could decide what sacraments each family was permitted (Bayly 1989: 360-1). In
the Jesuits' campaign to regain control over these decisions, they drew on the support of
disaffected mejaikarar [white-collar]  families,  and even kamarakarrar [fishing]  families
who had grown rich on trade but did not have ceremonial status in the village. But the
leading families  were  likewise  able  to  retaliate  by exploiting the  schisms within the
Church, threatening to shift to new affiliations like the Protestant London Missionary
Society,3 or even threatening to leave the fold (Bayly 1989: 316-8). In other cases, the less
powerful villagers also organised against the hierarchy, including the parish priest, using
allegations of financial or moral corruption to call on the Bishop to replace their priest,
threatening conversion if he failed to do so.
14 In 1930, the new diocese of Kottar was erected by papal decree from the southern and
Tamil-speaking part  of  the  diocese,  and entrusted to  the  indigenous  diocesan clergy
(Villavarayan 1956: 34). The Church was one of the few avenues for social mobility in the
villages and many Mukkuvars became clergy. The new diocese moved rapidly to reform
some of the most hated elements of Church governance in the villages, and with more
limited success, to strengthen a more doctrinal Catholicism against the forms of popular
devotion that  were central  to religious practice in the region,  such as  shrines to St.
Antony  and  other  saints  to  cure  possession  and  other  ailments.  One  of  the  earliest
reforms was to the kuthagai system of revenue generation for the coastal parishes, based
entirely on levies on the fishery. Following sustained campaigns by fishing families, intra-
Thinking beyond Secularism: The Catholic Church and Political Practice in Rur...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal , Free-Standing Articles
5
village divisions between pro- and anti-levy factions, and the conversion by a group of
anti-levy Paravar to Hinduism (Sivasubramanian 1996), the diocese eventually took steps
to curb expenditure and redistribute levies to all village residents (Villavarayan 1956: 52).
15 India’s independence led to new developments in the national Church. The understanding
of secularism implicit in the constitution of the new Republic of India (and made explicit
in a 1976 constitutional amendment describing India as a ʻsecularʼ republic), was one of
ʻequal  respect  for  all  religionsʼ,  rather  than  a  distancing  from  religion  altogether.
However,  secularism  as  the  increasing  desacralisation  of  life  remained  a  powerful
aspiration for modernising leaders like Nehru. This posed new challenges for the Indian
Church,  given  that  opposition  to  secularisation  was  a  key  principle  of  the  Church's
involvement in politics across the world, along with opposition to communism (Houtart
1984).  In  the  second  general  elections  in  1957,  for  example,  the  Catholic  Bishops
Conference of India (CBCI) issued a statement which was read in all  churches, asking
Catholic electors not to support candidates who were against religion, morality, and the
sanctity of family life. In the following elections too, Catholics were asked by the Tamil
Bishops  not  to  vote  for  the  communists  or  the  social  reformist  Dravida  Munnetra
Kazhagam (DMK), as both were opposed to religion. In general, the Catholic Church in
Tamil  Nadu was,  for the first  decades after independence,  explicitly in favour of  the
(Indian National) Congress (Narchison et al 1983: 94-5, 115-6). It also expanded its long-
standing work in education and health in this period, cooperating with the government
in these areas (Wilfred 1981: 829).
 
The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965)
16 The  election  of  Pope  John  XXIII  in  1958,  and  the  holding  of  the  Second  Vatican
Ecumenical  Council  in  1962,  marked  a  major  change  in  the  Catholic  Church’s
understanding  of  its  role  in  the  polity.  Historically,  society,  Church,  and  state  were
considered organically interlinked,  with political  authority seen as ultimately derived
from God.  The  Vatican  II  documents  express  an  acceptance  of  religious,  social,  and
political pluralism, a constitutional state, and the principle of freedom of the Church in
society (Hehir 1993: 22). The result of Vatican II at the national and local level was greater
lay participation,  both in parochial  administration and in the liturgy.  This was to be
facilitated by new structures of administration,  such as the Parish Councils,  and new
pastoral strategies, such as the Basic Ecclesiastical Communities. In addition, there was
new theological reflection, best known in the Liberation Theology of Latin America, but
also elsewhere, as in the Contextual Theology of South Africa (Lehmann 1996: 49, Littwin
1989). The idea of social ministry – the understanding that the work of the Church is the
defence of the person – became central. This was to be performed, not through direct
political involvement, as in the standing of clergy or religious for office, but through
social activism.
17 The ideas of  Vatican II  interacted with indigenous movements and currents of  social
reform emerging across Latin America and the decolonising nations of Asia and Africa
(Lehman 1996: 13-4). An Indian theology of liberation emerged from theologians such as
George  Soares-Prabhu  (1929-1995),  M.M.  Thomas4 ( 1916-1996),  and  Sebastian  Kappen
(1925-1993) (Kappen 1986: 305). It was cross-pollinated by Gandhian tropes of indigenous
development; in the early 1970s by the ideas of Naxalbari and the Jayaprakash Nararyan
movement, both of which challenged, albeit in different ways, the class bias of the Indian
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development model; and by the emergence of a voluntary sector (Shah 1988). But Indian
liberation theology was unique in being forced to grapple from the outset with India’s
multi-religious society. Here, the true community of Christ, if it was to offer the promise
of  transforming  social  structures,  must  necessarily  be  larger  than  the  Christian
community. As Kappen (1986: 310-31) wrote: ‘[T]he stirrings of a new theology can be
found only among theologians and such Christian groups who have broken loose, at least
mentally if  not also physically,  from the ghettos of church institutions and have cast
anchor in the secular world.’
18 In Kottar, some of these shifts had already begun with the arrival in 1950 of the Belgian
priest, Fr James Tombeur (1924-2002), of the Society of the Auxiliaries of the Missions
(SAM), who lived and worked in Kottar until his death. His efforts led to the formation of
the  Kottar  Social  Service  Society  (KSSS)  in  1963,  which  over  the  decades  took  up
numerous activities, such as a community health development project, cottage industries,
and cooperatives for fishermen and farmers. Of the KSSS, he wrote: ‘from the start [it]
was people-oriented and low priority was given to relief and to institutions like schools,
convents and so on. The inspiration was taken from the Gandhian type of development:
village-centred, cottage and village industries, providing employment to all and trying to
be self-supporting’  (Tombeur 1990:  41).  Tombeur’s  work also prefigured many of  the
themes of inculturation5 and lay participation emphasised by Vatican II. The churches he
helped build in the small, remote inland communities in which he served as parish priest
in the 1950s were the first (and still the only) local churches in the Dravidian style, rather
than the standard pseudo-Gothic (Collins 2007: 128-9).
19 Following Vatican II, these innovations began to be taken up across the diocese in the
form  of:  liturgical  renewal;  emphasis  on  the  Bible  and  on  catechism;  inculturation,
through the mass now being said in Tamil, and other local elements of worship added to
the liturgy; lay participation – in the mass, as in the celebrant facing the congregation –
and  in  ministry,  such  as  through  pious  associations;  new  structures  for  pastoral
administration, as well as for social awakening and involvement; and the taking of more
critical positions on social justice. Leading diocesan priests expressed a growing sense
that even developmental works might not be radical enough:
The developmental works of KSSS, commendable though in themselves, are they
not still becoming unwittingly agents of alienation? Do they not deflect the Church
from raising  fundamental  questions  about  the  condition  of  the  society  and the
structures of injustice at work? The strength of the developmental work can well
become the weakness of the Church in Kottar, in the sense that they can make the
Church insensitive to the real causes of poverty and underdevelopment and blunt
the Christian conscience of its social responsibility. They can make us forget that as
Church we are called upon to be catalysts and agents of change in society. This
responsibility of every Christian cannot be simply delegated to a developmental
organization. (Narchison et al 1983: 229-30)
20 The spirit of Vatican II remained strong in Kottar even after it waned elsewhere by the
early 1980s. A pastoral letter issued by Bishop M. Arokiaswamy in April 1986 traces the
problems  of  the  people  to  the  unjust  socio-economic  structures  of  feudalism  and
capitalism and speaks  of  the  danger  that  religion  might  legitimise  them.  Describing
various flawed Church models and pastoral approaches adopted in the past, such as the
‘traditional’ approach, the ‘charismatic-prayer’ approach, the ‘dependence’ approach, the
‘social service’ approach, and the ‘extremist’ approach (Jeremias 1989: 203), the Bishop
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recommended a new approach, the ‘Radical Church’ model,  which was guided by the
gospel vision and aimed to bring about radical change in all spheres.
21 The action plan for Kottar diocese laid out on the basis of this radical Church approach is
truly remarkable (Jeremias 1989: 204-5, and all citations below). It calls upon the Kottar
Church to take a stand in support of the various people's movements of workers and the
marginalised active in the district, arguing that ‘[w]e too, if we transcend the limits of our
parish, diocese and religion and collaborate with these movements, may accelerate the
spread and realization of the values of God's kingdom.’ The Church must rally round the
progressive parties and trade unions, and engage with Marxist ideology and movements
as sharing a common concern with human liberation. Strategies that involve violence are
not condemned out of hand; rather, structures that oppress people are seen as violent in
themselves. The action plan calls for priests and lay people to work together as equals,
and for youth and women to be involved. Political awareness and involvement is seen as a
Christian duty, the priests being responsible for fostering it among the laity.
 
The hardening of identities
22 The election of John Paul II as Pope in 1978 saw a retreat from the principles of Vatican II,
concurrent  with  a  strengthening  of  the  papacy,  and  the  encouragement  of  more
conservative groups like the Opus Dei (Della Cava 1992, Houtart 1984). This was reflected
in the Indian Church,  which also exercised greater  caution about  questions of  social
justice,  a  greater  emphasis  on  spirituality,  and  a  re-separation  of  the  notions  of
development and evangelisation.  Even prior to this  retreat,  the CBCI had maintained
silence,  and  even  tacit  support  for  the  Emergency  (1975-77),  perhaps  necessary  and
inevitable  for  a  minority  institution;  it  spoke  out  only  against  the  compulsory
sterilisations carried out by state agencies in this period. Despite the overall retreat from
more radical positions, the commissions (departments) established in this period, such as
the Labour Commission, and the Committee for Social Welfare, continued to take strong
stands on social justice.
23 Within Kottar diocese, notwithstanding the startling radicalism of the approach outlined
in the Bishop’s pastoral letter, ‘liberationists’ had at no point been the majority of the
clergy. Rather, their influence appears to have been due to the leadership of key Bishops
and other clergy.  However,  insofar as there was a clear shift  away from liberationist
positions by the end of the nineties, the impetus for this was not the outcome of internal
contestation, but of shifts in the global Church, and, importantly, of the need to respond
to external threats: the rise of Hindu nationalism as a significant political force, and the
growing popularity of Protestant Evangelical Churches, even among the Catholic masses.
24 Although their influence in Kanyakumari never reached the proportions that it did in
Latin America (Lehmann 1996), many Catholic villagers were attracted in the nineties to
the new Pentecostal Churches (Mosse, 1994a). Their practices of ‘sharing’ life histories
and ‘bearing witness’ to the moment of revelation were recognised even by radical clergy
as  providing  the  individual  catharsis  and  psychological  healing  that  post-conciliar
Catholicism, with its emphasis on social change, had turned away from. One response,
which may have succeeded in arresting the spread of these churches, was the charismatic
movement within the Catholic Church encouraged under Pope John Paul II; its prayer
meetings resemble those of  the Evangelical  movement,  with elements such as catchy
music, prophetic preaching, and collective cathartic participation.
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25 The growing political strength of Hindu nationalism posed a problem of another kind, in
this  case  for  the  Catholic  community  as  much  as  for  the  Church  as  an  institution.
Relations  between  the  Catholic  fishing  communities  and  their  Hindu  and  Muslim
neighbours had not been markedly conflicting. Of the 66 incidents of conflict recorded
since 1956 in the police stations covering half the fishing villages, only 21 were between
the Christian fishing communities  and Hindu or Muslim communities.  Of  these,  only
three may be called ‘communal’,  in the sense that by their very nature they invoked
religious identity: two were over religious symbols such as the desire of one community
to carry out a temple procession through the living quarters of the other; the third was
over competition in Panchayat elections. All the others arose from the same ‘secular’
causes – drunken disorderliness, harassment of women, minor thefts, etc. – as in other
inter- or intra-village fights.
26 While a few conflicts escalated due to political parties inflaming local quarrels in order to
secure  electoral  majorities  (Chiriyankandath  1993),  the  institutional  threat  came
primarily  from  the  rise  of  Hindu  nationalism  in  the  early  1980s,  reflected  in  two
watershed  events  in  the  district:  the  government-supported  construction  of  the
Vivekananda Rock Memorial on a site claimed also by Catholics as a spot where Xavier
had meditated, and an incident at Mondaikadu village in 1982, in which rumours set off a
spiral of retaliatory violence between Hindus and Catholics, leading to massive injury,
loss and destruction in the coastal  villages (Mathew 1983:  417).  While there were no
subsequent incidents of similar scale in the district, smaller incidents continued to occur,
such as the destruction of a church in 1995 (Indian Express 1995, Kottar Newsletter 1995).
The BJP’s rise to power nationally in the 1990s, and the rising tide of attacks against
minority  communities  across  the  country  in  the  decade  following,  contributed  to  a
growing sense of besiegement. This hardened identities to a great extent, but did not do
away entirely with syncretic  practices,  or  with villagers’  bargaining with the Church
hierarchy for secular ends. For instance, in the mid-1990s, when expressing frustration
with the local priest, or the diocese more generally, more than one fisherman voiced to
me in private a threat (usually rhetorical) to convert; such a conversion of a few families
did take place in the neighbouring diocese (Fishing Chimes, 1987). More significantly, in
1995, Catholic trawler owners voted as a group for the BJP, upset that the radical politics
of the diocesan Church had led it to favour the small-scale artisanal fishermen over them
in their conflicts over space and catch (Subramanian 2009: 228-34).
27 By  the  turn  of  the  century,  as  a  result  of  the  conjuncture  between  a  number  of
imperatives  –  the  need to  demonstrate  patriotism in the  face  of  Hindu nationalism;
gradual conformity with the international Church in its retreat from Vatican II; and the
changed understanding of ʻdevelopmentʼ  as market-led growth after India’s economic
reforms of the early 1990s – the Diocese had reverted to older priorities. These included
establishing elite educational  and medical  institutions,  and development work,  which
now consisted  increasingly  of  microcredit  groups  for  women  and  various  kinds  of
training programs around health, hygiene, or computer literacy. Nevertheless,  ‘power
from below’ and ‘breaking the yokes of injustice’ remain two of the four basic pillars of
the Diocese’s stated vision (Diocese of Kottar website), suggesting that liberationist values
were not just strategic but, rather, deeply held by a significant number of diocesan clergy.
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The Clergy
28 The Church governs over the fishing villages, but it is also intimately of the villages. The
parish priests embody this dual relationship, for they are functionaries of the Church,
and also frequently themselves come from the coastal villages. The 275 or so diocesan
clergy  are  drawn from the  district's  Catholic  castes:  Nadar,  Paravar,  and  Mukkuvar.
Although the inland Nadar priests appointed to coastal parishes are commonly said to
have a harder time than Mukkuvar or Paravar priests, virtually every priest regardless of
caste had his critics in the village. Rude jokes about their soft hands and clean-shaven
faces  (in  a  region  where  manliness  presumes  a  moustache),  and  rumours  (rarely
substantiated)  of  financial  corruption,  or  intimacy  with  women,  were  in  constant
circulation.  The  youth  wanted  dynamic  priests  with  new  ideas.  Old-timers  spoke
disdainfully about the younger priests with their casual manners, quick to shed their
cassocks, frequently off on their motorcycles to commissions and activities outside. They
recalled with nostalgia the ideal  priest  of  an earlier time,  distinguished by his  pious
demeanour and perennial brown cassock, who read the Bible or prayed with the people in
his spare time, and rarely left the village. Yet, as seen in the previous section, factions
involving the priest, and accusations against him, were as common earlier, especially in
the days when the priest also managed the parish funds.
29 The priest in the coastal parish is called upon to fulfil a variety of functions, unlike in an
inland one,  where parishioners  are  more comfortable dealing directly  with the civic
administration (Narchison et  al 1983:  138).  In the fishing village,  the priest  is  leader,
judge,  problem  solver,  liaison  with  government,  sole  representative  of  the  village,
preacher,  counsellor,  and  guide  (Ram 1992:  40).  The  work  of  the  priest  is  not  only
concrete  and  practical,  but  also,  as  famously  observed  by  Gramsci  (1971:  5-16),
‘intellectual’, that of generating social and political hegemony. There are, increasingly,
other intellectuals in the villages, such as social workers, political activists, and NGO staff,
but the priests are still the best educated as a group, and, by virtue of their historic pre-
eminence and institutional base, the most authoritative.
30 Gramsci  (1971:  5-16)  distinguishes  between  two  types  of  intellectuals,  organic
intellectuals and traditional intellectuals. Organic intellectuals are those who arise as a
part of every social group or class to give it ‘homogeneity and an awareness of its own
function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields’. Traditional
intellectuals are those who have always performed the role of intellectuals in society,
such  as  administrators  and  other  state  functionaries,  scholars,  scientists  and
philosophers; by virtue of their uninterrupted historical continuity as a group and their
special qualifications, they consider themselves autonomous of every social class.  The
Gramscian schema, while productive for this case, cannot be transposed directly across
time and space  (Arnold  1984,  Davidson 1984).  Gramsci  writes  that  ‘(t)he  category  of
ecclesiastics  can be considered the category of  intellectuals  organically bound to the
landed aristocracy’,  and further that,  unlike other social  groups,  a person of peasant
origin who becomes an ‘intellectual’ (priest, lawyer, etc.) generally ceases thereby to be
organically linked to his class of origin, and functions as a traditional intellectual.  In
India, the Church is both a minority institution and not organically linked to the state,
either constitutionally or through its affiliation with the dominant classes, such as the
landed aristocracy, and to a large extent represents instead the lower castes.6 Despite
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these differences,  Ram holds that the clergy of Kottar diocese function as traditional
intellectuals,  sharing  with  state  intellectuals  ‘a  commonly  understood  vocabulary  of
reform, rationalism, development and cultural nationalism’ (Ram 1995: 293).
31 There is much to Ram’s argument, for as seen in the previous section, the social projects
of  the Kottar  Church have frequently  paralleled those of  the state.  As  in Lehmann’s
discussion of basismo7 in Brazil, it is possible to see certain common ideological tropes
that underlie both religious and secular attempts at social transformation. However, just
as basismo represented a new respect for the subaltern, and thus a challenge to the more
authoritarian and elitist traditions of Church and state in Latin America,  so different
currents  within  the  Kottar  Church  must  be  seen  as  existing  in  some  tension  and
contradiction with each other,  and with the state.  For instance,  although the idea of
modernisation informed both state fisheries policy and the interventions of the KSSS, the
former resulted in large-scale  mechanisation initially  accessible  only  to  a  handful  of
villagers, while KSSS interventions through appropriate technology and cooperativisation
reached more widely into the villages.
32 I argue, therefore, that the reformist clergy are in fact drawn to act both as intellectuals of
their class, articulating the consciousness of that class, and of the Church and state. Their
identification as organic intellectuals is illustrated by the opening words to Fr Jeromias's
thesis in pastoral theology: ‘The eagerness to search for ways and means to better the
conditions of the fisherfolk gushes out of me as I am one who had experienced the stings
of poverty from my birth.’ In the ideas and aspirations the clergy hold and transmit, and
in the variety of pastoral approaches they favour, they mirror the different stages of, and
influences in, the universal Church's recent development, its location within the Indian
political community, and its local social and cultural embeddedness. This can be seen in the
wide range of  ideological  positions held by the clergy of  Kottar  diocese,  particularly
among those working in the fishing communities. These include: i) an exclusive focus on
the spiritual aspects of the religion, usually accompanied by the encouragement of works
of charity and non-political activities such as youth groups and prayer meetings, family
development, and personal ‘improvement’; ii) an emphasis on development understood
as  schools,  better  housing,  cooperatives,  and  community  health  programs;  iii)  an
emphasis  on  political  and  cultural  activism  (‘social  analysis’  and  political  critique)
informed by a liberationist theology.
33 These strands are not always mutually exclusive, and all the priests involve themselves in
development works within the village, and other traditional parochial responsibilities.
There  is  nonetheless  a  tension  between  the  first  category  of  priests,  concerned  to
separate religion from politics, and the other two. What distinguished the priests who
took one of the latter two positions, but chiefly the third, broadly influenced by Vatican II
and  liberation  theology,  was  that  they  were  intellectuals  in  the  commonplace  (non-
Gramscian) sense of the term, being highly educated and frequently engaged in research
and writing. Several of them had post-graduate degrees, and most had held important
appointments in the Diocese or elsewhere. The diocesan clergy all begin their education
in a local minor seminary where they are formed in matters intellectual and spiritual, and
also in skills like music, public speaking and acting, before being sent elsewhere to a
major seminary for theological studies. There is also a growing tendency for them to be
sent to college between minor and major seminary, or to pursue higher studies, often in
secular subjects (Narchison et al 1983: 211). Of the group I interviewed, almost all had
further  studied  subjects  they  believed  would  assist  them  in  their  role  as  (organic)
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intellectuals  and  leaders,  such  as  group  dynamics  and  management,  public
administration, law, media and communication, computers, and counselling.
34 Working in the coastal parishes, these priests had introduced reforms to break existing
power  structures,  encourage  lay  leadership,  reduce  violent  conflict,  and  systematise
parochial  administration.  For  instance,  Fr  Dionysius  interacted  intensively  with
individual fishermen to initiate fishermen’s cooperatives that would end the power of the
merchants; Fr Edwin refused to act as mediator with the administration over complaints,
but  began,  again  through  painstaking  house-to-house  visits,  to  set  up  participatory
administrative structures in his parish that eventually turned into the diocesan Basic
Christian Communities program; Fr Servatius sat on a three day fast in the church as a
way of ending the factional fighting in his parish. Fr Justus personally surveyed each of
the seven hundred houses in his parish in order to issue family cards containing basic
household information. He had computerised all parish records of birth and baptism so
that they were accessible alphabetically and was working to get individual land titles
issued to each family.
35 In the mid 1990s, some twenty of these priests had formed a group called the ‘Coastal
Analysis Programme’ aimed at studying and strategising around the social problems in
the villages. As the group grew, they decided to think of themselves as an enabling group
within the Diocese, providing direction and analysis to other organisations, building up a
library and documentation centre on coastal issues such as sea erosion, and carrying out
reflection on coastal ministry. They began to hold study meetings around issues such as
the Indian Government's deep sea fishing (DSF) policy which led to support for strikes
against this policy, educational backwardness and violence in the villages, and the design
of participatory governance structures. At one of the group’s meetings, I observed an
extensive  discussion on how to  work  out  a  program of  culture  for  the  villages,  the
understanding  being  that  certain  of  the  villagers’  cultural  habits  prevented  their
liberation. Many of those present spoke as ‘insiders’ to this culture, talking nostalgically
of old games and songs that had been lost with the coming of television. Although the
group disbanded after a few years,  its members’  interests became institutionalised in
diocesan  agencies  concerned  with  new media  and  the  revival  of  traditional  cultural
forms.
 
Lay associations
36 In the seventies, the diocesan Church began attempting to reform structures of village
governance,  prompted  partly  by  the  directives  of  Vatican  II,  and  partly  by  growing
popular resentment against the traditional headmen it had backed. The two main types of
organisations introduced in this period were the Parish Councils, and the Basic Christian
Communities (BCCs). Villagers’ participation in these organisations provides a third layer
within which to examine the intersection of religious authority, identity and faith with
the secular politics of the village.
37 The BCCs were brought to Kottar Diocese by Fr Edwin, a Mukkuvar diocesan priest who
had grown up in a fishing village. He had been involved with youth movements like the
Young Christian Students (YCS) and Young Christian Workers (YCW) at the beginning of
his  active  life,  keenly  read  Marx,  and  also  literature  about  the  base  communities  (
Communidades Eclesiales de Base, or CEBs) which had emerged in Brazil and other parts of
Latin America, post Vatican II (Lehman 1990: 128-9, Levine & Mainwaring 1989). His first
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parish  was  notorious  for  its  violent  factionalism,  making  the  idea  of  cross-cutting,
neighbourhood based units  of  participation especially  appealing as  an alternative.  Fr
Edwin began with house visits and sustained interaction with his parishioners between
1977-79, running formation programs on spiritual and socio-economic themes, as well as
on topics such as leadership, group dynamics, and the problems of fishermen, carrying
out some two hundred days of formation programs for various groups.
38 The BCCs emerged out of this process. The basic units set up by Fr. Edwin consisted of
thirty neighbouring households each, called the anbiam, which in turn sent five people to
the general body of the village, one of whom was elected to the executive committee. This
was then registered as a society – the Muḻu Vaḷarcci Sangam (Total/Integral Development
Society) or MVS. The MVS set up various committees such as an education committee,
and gave out short term loans. For the first time, the village leadership, including the
President’s post, was in the hands of the laity rather than the parish priest. A whole new
generation of active youth emerged from this process, but it was also met with a great
deal of opposition, with many of the past leaders and strongmen resenting their loss of
power, and using the increased visibility of women in public life to denounce the new
structures as ‘alien to the local culture’.
39 The BCCs were eventually officially adopted by the Diocese in 1984 as the basic units from
which representatives were to be elected to the Parish Council.  However,  their  most
radical element – institutional autonomy from the Church – was tempered by making the
parish priest rather than a lay person, the President of the Parish Council. In practice, the
scope of the BCCs varies from village to village, depending in part on the interest of the
parish priest and the powers he is willing to cede to them: in some villages they discuss
village finances, which give them a great deal of power, in others where this financial
control  is  lacking because of  opposition from the better-off  fishermen,  they function
almost solely as prayer groups, and are composed mainly of women and children.
40 Since  the  mid-eighties,  Parish  Councils  have  been  made  mandatory  in  each  parish.
Parishes which do not have them are not entitled to any diocesan money. Of course, the
bulk of village monies continue to be raised from within the village itself, and the Diocese
has no means to insist that these flow only through a Parish Council. The Parish Councils
act like a village governing body, with rules for membership and elections, the conduct of
meetings,  constitutional  amendments,  and  representation  for  different  categories  of
village  residents,  including  women  and  youth  movements,  and  for  key  village
associations, such as the fishermen’s cooperative groups.
41 Of the seven villages I studied, Parish Councils had been successfully established in three;
in the remaining four they had been prevented from being set up, or opposition to the
BCCs meant that they could not be set up as required through representation from the
basic communities; or the Councils were set up, but struggled against opposition and then
collapsed. In Kanyakumari village, for instance, the establishment of a Parish Council was
resisted, not because of factional differences, or the belligerence of previously dominant
families, but because they did not want women leaders. It was argued that women could
not take the lead on highly contentious issues in the fishery;  there was a sense that
physical prowess and backing continued to be important in settling these. It was also
feared that a Parish Council would mean that every decision would be subject to review
by  the  Church.  Nevertheless,  the  village  committee  that  governed  instead  was  also
elected,  and  consisted  entirely  of  active  fishermen,  rather  than  being  formed  by
nomination from the leading non-fishing families of the village, as in the past. The three
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functioning Parish Councils I observed did indeed follow rules of order. Their meetings
were held in the Parish Priest's office, the church, village meeting hall, or school. Matters
dealt with by the Council arose from a variety of sources: precedence, ongoing projects,
and petitions by villagers. A sample list of such matters, drawn from the three councils,
includes expenditure and revenues; development and welfare projects; fishing conflicts;
intra-village conflicts, usually factional; relations with other organisations, in the village
and outside, such as the fishermen’s cooperatives; village services; the school; stopping
alcohol sales; and collective support in the lean fishing season for the families belonging
to the various service castes (mainly barbers).
42 The organisations described here – the BCCs and Parish Councils – emerged, not out of
internal  contestation  and change  within  the  villages  themselves,  but  out  of  broader
debates and changes at other levels, such as the Universal Church and the Indian state.
While the structures may have been externally conceived, however, it is conditions at the
village level that determined their reception, functioning, and survival. The historical
compact between Church and state which gives the former relative autonomy to oversee
law and order, development, and finance in the villages has some merit, for the state
lacks the ability to work through overlapping and networked structures based close to
the lifeworld, such as the Basic Communities, pious associations, and youth groups. Nor is
it willing to invest resources and personnel in the kind of close and sustained attention to
formation seen here,  in the efforts  of  parish priests  such as  Fr  Edwin,  for  instance.
Political parties have managed to make some inroads, linking up to factions, or creating
their  own  youth  and  women’s  wings,  but  they  too  lack  the  Church’s  access  to  the
lifeworld of the villages, and nor do they represent the villages in their entirety as the
Church does.
43 It has been argued that, as bodies aimed at democratising the Church, the power and the
promise of the CEBs in Brazil was greatest when they had no legal or religious status and
remained informal bodies, that is, when they represented a real alternative to the Church
hierarchy (Lehmann 1990: 131). This was not the case for long in Kottar, because the BCCs
early on became an official Commission of the Diocese, with central rules and templates;
they were further integrated into diocesan administration when they were made the
basis  of  the Parish Council.  On the other hand,  there seems to be consensus among
observers of  the Latin American CEBs (Lehmann 1996,  1990,  Adriance 1995,  Levine &
Mainwaring 1989), that their success depended very much on the presence of supportive
priests  or nuns,  and  on  support  from the  local  hierarchy,  so  that  they  were  never
completely autonomously generated and sustained spaces for lay participation. In this
sense, the Kottar BCCs are no different. Given this, we may question the extent to which
the  BCCs  had  a  radical  impact  on  the  nature  of  Church  authority  in  the  villages.
Lehmann’s (1996:  76) argument might certainly apply here:  ‘This paradox of an anti-
hierarchical movement depending for its survival on the hierarchy itself,’ had the effect
of blunting the possibility of genuine transformation of the Church.
44 However, one must look beyond the democratisation of the Church to judge the true
significance of these organisations. In her ethnography of these villages, Subramanian
(2009: 250-2) argues that villagers’ negotiations with the Church, other powers, and the
modern state, reveal a long history of claims-making with its own vernacular forms, one
of  which  is  the  seeking  of  alternative  patrons.  She  resists  the  idea  that  rights  and
democracy might have a European or specifically modern provenance, and seeks instead
to ‘provincialise’ them. While I am sympathetic to this aim, I see the establishment of
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liberal  democratic  institutions  and  processes  under  the  postcolonial  state  as  having
enormous  consequence  for  a  new  vocabulary  of  claims-making,  as  well  as  for  new
technologies of governance. The associations described here reflect the politics of the
reformist  Church,  but  also  the  deep  influence  of  the  ideas  of  social  equality,  and
democracy  as  participation  in  governance,  contained  in  India’s  liberal-democratic
constitution (Mosse 1994b).
45 While the associations described here were initiated by the Church, participants do not
simply accept its authority. What we see instead is a struggle between the Church, the
village community, traditional village leaders, and hitherto marginalised groups such as
youth and women. What becomes clear is that individual, gender, and class interests are
emerging  to  challenge  the  traditional  identities  of  village  and  Church  community.
Participation is directed at transforming society itself. We also see a widening of the will
to self-governance, and the routinisation of the procedures and technologies of modern
governance. This can be seen in the insistence that all members of the community have
equal claims to participate, and that leaders, even at the village level, should be elected. A
self-conscious  modernity  may  also  be  seen  in  the  manner  in  which  meetings  are
conducted, with rules of order,  minutes,  and formal agendas.  Various technologies of
(self-)  governance  are  beginning  to  be  adopted,  such  as  village  censuses  and  the
computerization of village records; family cards indicating membership in the village;
and the assignment of individual land titles to land previously held in common in order
to allow villagers to apply for bank loans. It may be that, as Lehmann (1996) has argued
regarding the Brazilian CEBs, the deeper impact of these associations has been to serve as
mediums of modernity.
 
Conclusion
46 Religion acts variously: as an essential element of identity; as a matter of private faith;
and as the basis for social critique and reform. Examination of this phenomenon at three
levels - the national Church and Diocese, the clergy, and the laity – provides both an
institutional  and  a  political  economy  perspective  on  the  role  of  religion  in  politics,
undermining assumptions that it acts in any essential way.
47 The evolution of the Catholic Church has mirrored developments at the various scales
into which it enters: the universal Church, the Indian political community, and the local
social and cultural community within which it is embedded. Even at each of these scales,
there is considerable heterogeneity, as the reversals following Vatican II, or the always
contested status of Liberation Theology, suggest at the scale of the global institution. At
the national and local scales, both for its faithful, and for others, it embodies a variety of
meanings including faith, identity, and governance. It has had to steer a careful course
between these multiple scales and diverse meanings. It has had to accommodate to the
state and carry out governance functions in order to strengthen itself as an institution,
while  seeking  to  retain  an  always  restive  congregation.  It  has  had  to  cultivate  and
maintain  a  distinct  identity,  characterised  by  a  unique  tradition  of  worship,  while
resisting attempts to cast it as alien and non-indigenous. It has had to fulfil both the
spiritual and the secular needs of its followers. And it has had to resist the secularisation
of  society,  in  the  sense  of  a  withdrawal  of  religion  from  the  public  sphere,  while
welcoming state secularism in the sense of constitutional protections for all religions.
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48 Like every state, the local Church has had to contend with challenges to its legitimacy,
such  as  those  contained  in  accusations  of  corruption,  or  priests’  relationships  with
women. The difficulties of maintaining legitimacy are linked in part to the nature of the
religious identity of the coastal Catholics. This was always a somewhat fluid construct,
incorporating tropes and symbols from existing religious traditions, and retaining social
features such as caste. Conversion, real or threatened, has over the centuries been used as
a bargaining tool with the institution. Dissatisfaction with the social reading of religion
introduced  by  Vatican  II  led  some  parishioners  to  transfer  to  Pentecostal  churches.
Despite the threat of Hindu nationalism Catholic trawler owners voted for the Hindu
nationalist BJP to indicate displeasure with diocesan policies favouring the small-scale
fishers. Each of these moments of dissent sparked a revision of course by the hierarchy.
The hierarchy’s  own values  and practices  are  fluid  and open to  multiple  influences.
Following Vatican II, there was increased interest by progressive theologians and clergy
in using ‘Indian concepts and traditions of worship’. The rise of Hindu nationalism in the
last two decades has had the effect of  hardening religious identities,  yet Church and
secular intellectuals have continued to share values of development, reform, and uplift.
Thus the alliances between the state, the institutional Church and its members, and the
wider community, continue to be tactical and frequently shifting.
49 As part of its faith, and as part of its effort to retain control over its members, the Church
has resisted secularisation in the sense of the withdrawal of religion from the public
sphere  and  the  reduction  of  religion  to  a  private  matter.  However,  secularism  as
constitutional protection for all religions, has been interpreted by state officials to mean
a  representative  role  for  the  institutional  Church in  all  matters  representing  Indian
Catholics (or, in Kanyakumari, all matters referring to the fishing villages), and in this
sense, it has been welcomed by the Catholic Church,8 for it has served to reinforce the
sense of a natural and uncontested unity between the institution and its members. A
stronger challenge to this understanding of secularism as mutual accommodation was
posed by Vatican II. On the one hand, the move to decentralise Church decision-making
to the national and regional levels, the emphasis on pluralism between Church and state,
and inculturation and diversity of practices of worship, allowed the Catholic Church to
ʻintegrateʼ  more  explicitly  within  Indian  society.  On  the  other,  priests  inspired  by
Vatican II’s emphasis on social justice, and the theological turn to liberation, sought to
interpret  their  religion  politically.  In  doing  so  they  confronted  more  explicitly  the
hierarchies of the state and the arrangements of mutual accommodation that underlay its
ʻsubcontractingʼ of authority to the Church. But by reinterpreting the faith to make it
speak to urgent social  realities,  they sought simultaneously to reaffirm its  value and
relevance for the vast numbers of the faithful.
50 As an institution of civil society, the Church represents the polyvalence of the sphere
(Casanova 1996). On one side, it carries out several of the functions of the state, both
those that are directly administrative and those that have the function of generating
hegemony for its values of development, democracy as institutionalised participation,
and  secularism  as  equal  treatment.  At  the  same  time,  struggles  within  the  Church
challenge these hegemonic understandings. Against development as modernisation, they
pose development as social justice; against democracy as institutionalised participation,
they encourage more radical  and open-ended conceptions of  democracy;  and against
secularism as equal respect for all religious institutions and practices, they seek to infuse
and  transform the  public  sphere  through  a  critical and  political  reading  of  Christ’s
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message.  It  may  be  possible  to  conclude  then that  certain  forms  of  public  religious
practice are not incompatible with what Needham and Sunder Rajan (2007: 33) describe as
‘the  analogues  and  constituents  of  secularism:  reason,  ʻmere  reasonablenessʼ,
rationalism,  pluralism,  tolerance,  law,  multiculturalism,  minority  rights,  democracy,
liberalism.’
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NOTES
1. Mosse’s (1994a) work on Ramnad district in Tamil Nadu makes some of the same arguments,
with a greater focus on the ritual sphere, and less attention to the role of the clergy and popular
associations.
2. ʻInculturationʼ,  defined  as  ‘the  on-going  dialogue  between  faith  and  culture  or  cultures’
(Shorter 1988: 11), is a term and concept that gained currency in the 1960s following Vatican II.
But ‘accommodation’ to local cultures, or in the Indian case, ʻIndianisationʼ, has a long history
within missiology. See also Collins 2007.
3. If the LMS had limited reach, it was not only because of the defence put up by the Catholic
Church,  but also because the LMS themselves were more interested in the inland low castes
(Subramanian 2009: 53, Agur 1903: 70).
4. That M.M. Thomas was a member of the Mar Thoma Church, rather than the Catholic, reflects
the ecumenism of Indian liberation theology. For the origins of the Mar Thoma Church, see Bayly
1989: 312-20.
5. Fr James was deeply influenced by Fr Vincent Lebbe (1877-1940), a Belgian missionary in China
in the early twentieth century, for whom inculturation (then referred to as ‘accomodation’) was
about adopting the culture not of the elites but of the popular classes, and about aligning with
them against colonial power and racism.
6. This  is  not  uniformly true across  the country –  the earliest  Christians,  of  the Syrian and
Malankara churches in Kerala, are large landowners and historically close to the Travancore and
Quilon rulers; Portuguese missionising in Goa also yielded a more Brahmin and upper-caste catch
than in southern India.
7. Influential social current of belief that the people, the ‘grassroots’, have a distinctive culture
and outlook on life and society and that political and religious salvation necessarily involves
listening to them and gaining empathy with their culture (Lehman 1996: 13-4).
8. Not  all  attempts  at  equal  treatment  have  been  welcomed.  In  1994,  Jayalalitha,  the  Chief
Minister of Tamil Nadu, issued a series of pictures of herself depicting various Hindu goddesses.
Her attempt at ‘equal treatment’,  involving her portrayal as the Virgin Mary, only served to
provoke state-wide demonstrations by enraged Catholics.
ABSTRACTS
This article re-opens the debate on secularism in India by looking at a religion and a region that
has  historically  been  marginal  to  this  discourse,  focusing  on  the  way  in  which  the  Catholic
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Church has historically mediated the relationship between individuals and the state, among the
fishing communities of South India. The Catholic Church’s dominant position among the fishing
communities, its minority status within India, as well as theological and other shifts that have
taken place within the global Church, lead it to articulate a secular, even radical politics as its
primary mode of religious engagement. Radical clergy, many from fishing backgrounds, act as
both organic and traditional intellectuals in the Gramscian sense, linking the traditional religious
concerns  of  the  Church  to  the  secular  interests  of  their  parishioners.  Likewise,  villagers
participate in Church-generated associations spaces to secure wider political goals. The paper
concludes  that  certain  forms of  religious  organisation in  the  public  sphere  might  indeed be
compatible with democracy, citizenship, and even secularism.
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